

The Logic of “Mutual Transmission” in Huayan and Zen Buddhist Philosophy – Toward the Logic of Co-existence in a Globalized World

Hisaki HASHI*

Abstract

Is it true that in the history of East Asian cultures there was less “philosophy”, less “logic” and “rationality” before the process of modernization began in the nineteenth century? A number of scholars of East Asian Studies believe this is a form of prejudice. For example, Nishida Kitarō stated that in East Asian cultures there is another form of logic, which can be called the “*logica spiritus*” (心の論理). This article examines the essential parts of this logic with regard to Huayan and Zen Buddhist philosophy, and is thus an effort at comparative philosophy.

Keywords: Huayan Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, logic of “*soku*” (即), comparative philosophy, philosophy in a globalized world

Izveček

Ali je res, da je bilo v zgodovini vzhodnoazijskih kultur manj »filozofije«, manj »logike« in »racionalnosti«, preden se je začel proces modernizacije v devetnajstem stoletju? Številni učenjaki vzhodnoazijskih študij verjamejo, da je to predsodek. Na primer, Nishida Kitarō pravi, da je v vzhodnoazijskih kulturah druga oblika logike, ki jo lahko poimenujemo »logična duhovnost« (心の論理). Članek raziskuje esencialne dele te logike s premislekom skozi filozofijo huayanskega in zen budizma in tako doprinese k primerjalni filozofiji.

Ključne besede: huayanski budizem, zen budizem, logika »*soku*«, primerjalna filozofija, filozofija v globalnem svetu

* Hisaki HASHI, Dr. phil. (PhD), Univ.-Doz. (Dr. habil.),
by Habilitation authorized professor for full areas of philosophy
[hisaki.hashi\[at\]univie.ac.at](mailto:hisaki.hashi[at]univie.ac.at)



Introduction

Someone who is fixed exclusively within the frame of the occidental philosophy tends to build up a dogma, which is that in the history of East Asian cultures there was less rationality, logic and philosophy before the modernization process that started in the nineteenth century¹. In fact, while there are *different characteristics* between the philosophy of the Occidental World and that of East Asia, it is not valid to state that there was no philosophy in the latter before its modernization and contact with the West. A more correct statement would be as follows: Before the modernization of the nineteenth century there *was no Western-style logic* in East Asia. It is thus evident that there are two categories in philosophy: *that of the West* and *that of East Asia*. There is a lack of any formal analysis in saying that there was "less logic before modernization in East Asia". In comparative thinking we set a certain category, for example, "philosophy". If it is true that the "philosophy" of the West cannot be closely identified with the "philosophy" (*tetsugaku* 哲学) of East Asia, *we have to compare* their specific differences to grasp the respective characteristics of "Occidental philosophy" on the one hand, and East Asian philosophy on the other. Then, by identification, we have a pair of principal concepts which are certainly in a complementary relation: the *Philosophy in a Global World* and the different aspects of the West and of East Asia.²

1 This is a key issue in this context, and one of the most serious approaches to it is in Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, in the chapters on India and China. In another work of Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, there are also chapters on Asia which present similar ideas. It was a common practice for European intellectuals at that time of the nineteenth century to try and establish their own encyclopedias of world cultures. While this can be seen as progressive, a pre-"interculturality" before the process of globalization that took place in the twentieth century, there remain a number of problems. The most important is that such writers (Hegel and others) only saw the surface of Asian cultures, with Europe and European ideas remaining central. There are thus many problems with Hegel's chapters dealing with Asian religions and philosophy, such as the confused interpretation of Brahmanism (Hinduism and Buddhism). (Hegel 1986)

The fundamental reflections on the question of whether there was "philosophy" in East Asia before the process of modernization were presented by scholars during the period of the Meiji Restoration in Japan. The translation of a number of works and writings of Western philosophy meant that Japanese scholars had to find suitable words or make new terms using the existing Chinese characters. For more detailed information on this, see the article of Fujita 2009.

2 For the method of comparative philosophy see the article of Hashi 2014b.

From the Origin of East Asian Philosophy

Western philosophy began in ancient Greece with a tendency to seek scientific, verifiable knowledge. Their method of progress was to use *dialogos* and *dialektike*, in which a certain theme must be analyzed by reflective and critical argument again and again, until an undividable truth can be found. Aristotle (2000) used this method from the beginning of his *philosophia prima*, in which he established his essential concept of *ousia* through sharp criticism of his teacher, and thus by attacking the concept of an “*idea*” from Plato. To state and verify is an undividable truth which can be stated as a general category viewed from an observer’s position which is not mixed up with the represent of the thesis as an empirical person. (The person who can be injured by sharp criticism is out of the theme in those discourses.)

Criticizing and arguing against one who is an opposite the philosophical logics has its own mighty in view of a debate. Without any dependence on a personality one can execute one’s own opinion in a generalized position: the category as a firm statement for a generalized truth in *dialogos*, in which a principal truth must be shown as an undividable, irrefutable truth. The theoretical competence is highly developed; the abstraction of one’s own conception in a general category is always executed. But the other focus, which is less regarded, shows the following aspect: Categories are positioned by *one’s own personality*, and the states are also represented by *one’s own personality*. The represented positions must confirm that the stated truth is actualized by *one’s whole body and mind*, in which a correspondence must be found *between one’s theoretical statement and one’s own practice in daily life*. For an examination, if and how far the stated theory is corresponded with *one’s own life practice*, there is less method in Occidental philosophy which can be seen as fully valid in this regard. Aristotle is one of the philosophers who took full responsibility for the correspondence of his theory and his actual empirical life. However, in his way of sharp critique against his teacher, Plato according to Plato’s “*idea*”, Aristotle executed his argument rigorously and without any hesitation or modesty. One’s own teacher is for a disciple quasi *sacro sanctus*—although this position was less valued by several representative thinkers in ancient Greece. Their *philosophiein* has the noble purpose of grasping and unifying an irrefutable truth as a generated category, by which particular persons and personalities in one’s daily life are secondary problematics.

If we consider Aristotle’s criticism against Plato, most intellectuals from East Asian cultures will feel a kind of culture shock in a negative way, as the behavior of Aristotle is the opposite of the principal concept of 礼 (禮 *li*), one of the well-known articles of the five principal categories of Confucian philosophy

(Confucius 1978)³. With regard to these different ways of thinking we can say: "Philosophy" in a global world is *a unity*, but it implies the *uncertain* "One".

Within this "One" we acknowledge various different characteristics and orientations: The *Uncertain Two* between the European and East Asian Philosophy. Let us say—with regard to the original idea of Confucius' *Lunyu*: the ways and systems of philosophical thinking in East Asia have been striving for another approach with regard to European and Occidental Philosophy: i.e., Philosophy (including religions) in East Asian cultures aim to establish an ethical life for an ethical society in the real world. This does not have the keenly critical *dialogos* which was used by Aristotle in argumentations in the above mentioned style. For this method of dialogue and dialectic in Occidental Philosophy, Aristotle's critique is correct, as he was stimulated by the older knowledge of Plato and therefore developed several ideas as the direct successor of his teacher. A lot of queries about Plato's thoughts could be answered by Aristotle, so a critical dialectic continuum was created for the progress and a development of philosophy. The continuous process of renewal through argumentation about old and classical ideas accompanies the development of philosophy in the West.

However, with regard to this "constant renewal" there is a philosophical question that arises, and this is whether this unity, namely the category of a "renewal by overcoming an old idea" is always for the best: Is the renewal of old ideas always valid *only* as a way of raising quality? Is an old idea *only there to put us out of the "mainstream"* which is dominant for a while *only in a surface* of a society? Evidently, the answer is No. Every intellectual in East Asia remembers the well-known saying of Confucius: 溫故知新, which can be interpreted as follows: "In evaluation and acknowledgement of the classics, humans are able to achieve new

3 Some examples are found in vol. I. 2 (為政篇), paragraph 7: 不敬何以別. Confucius said in *Lunyu* (論語): "Things of that differ human and animals are respect and dignity in thinking and handling," *li* 禮 (礼). The concept of *li* is bound to the modesty that the knowledge of human is only a part of the world and universe. Another part of *Lunyu* in the same volume I.2. paragraph 5 shows the special concept of *li* 禮 in accord of the relationship of children to parents *xiao* 孝: 生事之以禮、死葬之以禮、祭之以禮. Confucius told: "Thinking and Practicing in things of life, thinking and practicing of things by death and in funeral, thinking and handling in celebration of life—all those should be manifested through the concept of *li* 禮." Even if this part is focused especially to the respecting love of children to parents, the principle of the *li* can be interpreted generally that it is a concrete manifestation of *respect with modesty* in a true love to humans, beings in a world and universe. The handling of *li* as practice is accompanied by grasping of *li* as a theory. And vice versa: Theoretical understanding of *li* and its realization in handling are in a continual unity. A separation of theory and practice or a dualism of pure categories and a human as a user of the categories does hardly succeed in this philosophy, since philosophy (*zhe xue* 哲学) is oriented to grasp and realize the good and truth for human life for individual, public and society.

knowledge.” (Confucius 1978, 80)⁴ In other words, something new can emerge at the intersections of *classic and modern thinking*. Let us focus on the logical function of classical thinking and its essential mind on a philosophical level in a globalized world.

The Logical Functions of the Term “*soku*”

When focusing on this issue, let us remember that in East Asian cultures there are a number of other approaches to philosophy, logic and science that have a long history, which can contribute and enrich our contemporary philosophy in a global world. One of the most important things in this case is the principle of logic. The meaning and function of *soku* 卽 (Jap. *soku*, Chin. *ji*) is well known to researchers of Buddology, but its philosophical significance and possible contribution to philosophy in a global world has not been clarified. For this reason comparative thinking in comparative philosophy is needed.

The term 卽 (Jap. *soku*) primary has the function of connecting one thing with another. This is often clear in the philosophy of Huayan⁵ and Zen Buddhism⁶, in which the terminological significance of this word has been shown.

But let us examine the function of logic more clearly. Here we are, as a mediator facing the cross-cultural dimension of European formal logic and the Huayan- and Zen logic of East Asia. As a preposition we have to notice that the term *soku* has its value, if different things, [A and B], in other words, [A and non-A] are in connection or bound together. If we find the same word twice, [A *soku* A] or [B *soku* B], it has less meaning, as it only shows a tautology in except of confirming the principle of the definition of identity. Sueki Takehiro (1921–2007), one of the most outstanding logicians in Japan (University of Tokyo), presented a unique thesis that the logics of *soku* in Huayan Buddhism has a special position—especially in view of the comparison between formal logic and analytical philosophy in the West:

- 1) *soku* includes the definition of identity—as [A is A], and [B is B].
- 2) It shows at the same time the definition of difference.
- 3) It shows the significance of “*Transmission between A and B*”, in other words, [A and non-A].

4 In vol. I. 2 (為政篇), paragraph 11, 溫故而知新、可以為師矣.

5 In the original Huayan Buddhist texts this term is mostly shown in Takakusu and Watanabe 1990, 684–92; Sueki 1980, 218–9.

6 See the original 金剛般若經, *Vajracchedikā prajñā pāramitā sutra* in Nakamura and Kino 1990.

It is remarkable that 1) and 2), the definitions of two opposite categories, i.e. identity and difference, are shown at the same time in the same term.

Excursus:

Just this point is difficult to grasp for many Western philosophers and logicians, who keep their frame of thinking *only in a pure analytical philosophy or formal logic* (and thus in Western style). By their query or argument I would confirm that this is the *most important characteristic of language and culture*. It is characteristic that a Chinese script *per se* is built up on the basis that both opposite categories are integrated: Generally, many fundamental Chinese script shows a picture like an icon in the empirical world (like 日 as “sun” or 目 as “eye”). On the other hand, many other scripts present deep dimensional conceptions and meanings like the 考 (think, conceive). A lot of Chinese scripts show the integrative character in combining an empirical picture and a conceptual truth like the 悟 as the integration of the both parts, 心 (spirit or mind) and 吾 (I, self). A clear cut dimension of *meta-language* and *empirical language of objects* can be hardly created by Chinese language *per se*, because the culture of Chinese scripts is bound to an “*integrative relationship*” of the totally different categories of “empirical truth” and “transcendental truth”. Maybe, this is not enough to persuade someone who thinks *only* in the frame of formal logics or analytical philosophy in Western style. But, this is a fundamental example to show that the fundamental character to define and integrate the both different things and categories is set as a *principle* in the Chinese language and culture.

Anyway, *A soku* 即 *A*, twice the same, then nothing happens; it is a pure tautology. Only if there is a difference appearing, *A* and *non-A*, does there occur a kind of relationship. Identity and difference, both belong to “a pair of opposites”, but in well-organized harmony. The real core of the term “*soku*” is in reference to 3), the mutual transmission between different positions.

The foundation of logic is in general—in Chinese philosophy and Buddhist philosophy in East Asia—is dealing with the world of the environment, the world of experience in a tangible life (Akizuki 1978; Hashi 2014a). Let us look at a phenomenon arising out of this circumstance. In the world of nature there is *nothing* which is in every detail “*only the same and identical*” with another. Every plant has its own appearance and its identity, even if they belong to the same species. Here, we have to notice that this logic of Buddhist philosophy actually orientates to the “*theory of relations*”. The theory of substance (or substratum) is *not* in the

foreground in this part of Buddhism,⁷ because Buddhist philosophy focuses on the phenomena in the real world, the problems of real life, the causality of human suffering and that of other beings, and the ways of overcoming this. Things in the world always belong to the “running time” with a dynamic change of space. *Every moment is emerging, staying shortly and vanishing forever.* Nothing remains for eternity. Nothing remains substantial. What does remain is only the principle of “*anitya*” (無常 Jap. *mujō*), the running and vanishing of every being in time-space. On the other hand there is something more remaining, i.e. the “*relation*” of things and beings through their causal, logical connection.⁸ Let us review this core, the theory of relation: A plant α finds itself in the same time-space with another plant β . They both present themselves with their own identities, but they do not struggle in brutality. They exist despite their own unities and identities in harmony. A *co-existence* of [*A* and *non-A*] in a complementary relationship is the core of this logic.

What Does It Contribute to the Philosophy in a Globalized World?

Let us have a look at the construction of logic. [*A soku B*] means *A* and *non-A* in a *co-existential relation* in a full *complementarity*. [*A soku B*] never causes a negative relationship with regard to an isolation, for example hating or struggling violently. [*A* and *B*] are *not substratums* that exists forever, but they are beings in a *co-relation* of *emerging, developing and vanishing*. Because they are not eternal stable substratums, they both are striving for peace in *co-existential relation*. [*A* and *B*] are *sō-soku* 相即, i.e. they are in a *mutual transmission* and *intra-relation* in their mutual encountering. [*A*] accepts [*B*], [*A*] accepts [*non-A*], and vice versa. [*A* and *B*] are in the intra-relation *sō-nyū* 相入: [*A*] puts itself into the dimension of [*B*], and [*B*] also puts itself into the dimension of [*A*].⁹ Through this active exchanging of one’s own position, the transmission of energies from different characteristics

7 *Nāgārjuna: Mūla madhyamaka karikā* in Weber-Brosamer and Back 2005; Nakamura and Kino 1990; Nakamura 2005; Hashi 2014a.

8 Since Buddhism was a complex mix of religion and philosophical thought from the very beginning on, it problematizes the issues of real life phenomena, human suffering and the goal of overcoming this. A phenomenon of life is grasped in the middle of an empirical life. Because such life phenomena are always changing dynamically, which is transmitted by different relations, a substantializing of particular things which is stable from any influence and disturbance from the empirical world is difficult to find and thus to confirm what actually is the essential being of a “substance” is. Instead of a theory of substance, theories to explain the “relations” of various changing phenomena have been proposed since Early Buddhism: see for example the term of *pratitya samutpāda* 因縁生起 in Takasaki and Hayashima 1993.

9 See in Takakusu and Watanabe 1990, 503, 505, 691–2; Sueki 1980, 203–6.

arises dynamically. Sueki Takehiro (1980, 218–9) called this way of Huayan logic the “Processual Dialectic of Harmony”.

The Contribution of the *soku* (即) – Logic for Interdisciplinary Studies

Principally we can say that in this *soku*-logic of the Huayan philosophy the things and beings [A and B] ([A and non-A]) are not “monades” in the original and rigorous sense of Leibniz: Primarily then each of them is not shown as a closed organism. Particular things in Buddhism are *not bound* to a “substantiality”; in the Mādhyamika School since Nāgārjuna, everything is an “emptiness” i.e. *free of substantiality*. Each thing is *not focused as a static one*, but instead everything is changing “*free of fix substance*” dynamically in a real time-space relation. Their potentiality for accepting and learning from others is enormous. *A* and *B* have in their physical existence a “*Field of Between*” in which the different two (*A* and non-*A*) are encountering, communicating, crossing and emerging for each other. I call these particular kinds of things, which are “free of substance” in bounding to the environment, *corpus*, *A*, *B*, *C* (...) and so on. Each of them has a [*Field of Between*] in encountering with another one, in which the one (for example *A*) has its own characteristic, bodily existence and contents of self-consciousness. The latter is an open court for crossing, encountering, competing and completing. Every personal self has one’s own system of life, which I call “*intra-system unity*”. The others are *extra-system-unities*, and each one is *not isolated* from another. They are *corpora* (corpus in the singular) in an open court with their different disciplines and thinking systems. “*The Field of Between*” is a potentiality for inter-action, mutual transmission and *intra-relation*, and its possibility of emergence. With regard to our focal point there is just one important issue to note: It is not the field of random mixing to a unity of any kind. To integrate different factors, [*A* and non-*A*], both must be compared cautiously from both positions of [*A* and non-*A*]. *Every step of scientific and ethical thinking is bound to a comparative reflection.*

The “Corpus” in the “Field of Between” – How Does it Work?

I will use one term of Varela, “*enactivism*”,¹⁰ which positions an *intra-system* into an environment which is able to recognize a *tangent between itself and other selves*.

10 For a comparative philosophical reflection to Varela’s enactivism and theories of Buddhist Psychology (*vijnapti matravada*) see Shiba 2015. The *corpus* of one’s self, as a physical body and the ability to grasp, to memory and to keep an essential knowledge and cognition builds up this dimensional core of physical reality and cognitive unit. (Hashi 2014a; Hashi 2014b; Hashi 2015a)

The latter are the *extra-systems*. The *corpus* as an *intra-system* puts itself within the experience of *inter-action*, construes a dialectical field of tension, taking a query and question between one's *own intra-system* and *other's extra-system-unities*. It enters into the *extra-system unity*. It presents one's *intra-system* with regard to a dialogue to come to the essential core of the problem, getting an answer in a higher level of "*integration*" of *intra-system* and *extra-system unities* (Hashi 2014a), by which the mutual transmission between *intra-* and *extra-system* is executed. A dynamic self-transformation based on comparative thinking is the key point to fulfil this process step by step. By grasping this pair of terms, [Intrasystem] and [Extrasystem], it would be irrational to assume that one is *fixed executively* to the position of an old style of analytical philosophy, taking that a "system" should be defined exceptionally as an objectivized unity by which a thinking person as an observer and operator is definitively separated from the objectivized thing. With regard to the above mentioned pair of concepts, the *Intrasystem* means [one's own thinking unity] based on one's bodily life and existence. The *Extrasystem* is something that is not similar or that cannot be integrated into one's own thinking system. The theory of comparative thinking includes both units, the [Intrasystem and Extrasystem], whereas the thinking and acting one as an executor of its own bodily life finds itself confronted with both pair categories—in other words, the *Identification and Difference*.

Co-existential Mind of Huayan Buddhism as an Optimistic Utopia? – The Significance of the Logic of Intellectual Negation in Zen Buddhism

An empirical phenomenon of life is that we have to struggle to achieve the validity of our rights, opinions and existence in a society. A correct opinion alone does not help and support the ability to execute one's own rights. The Huayan Buddhist philosophy orientates towards a beautiful world like the Network of Indraha, which implies that every particular being has its own essential unity within its entelechy.¹¹ If the core of the entelechy of [Alpha] arises, its essential being is reflected by another being [Beta] within its own essential nature. Reflecting from one jeweler to another, the world is fulfilled by respectable entelechies. Does this sound too optimistic when faced with a hard life? In the difficult world of human beings, we can complete the Huayan logic for dynamic harmony *soku* with the sharp and severe "logic of negation" of Zen Buddhist philosophy: 即非 *soku-hi*,

11 The Net of Indraha: Nakamura 2004; Tsujimura 1985.

the [negation of *soku*]¹² a dialectic logic of the negation to [*A* and *non-A*] at the same time: The original expression was given in the Diamond Sutra (*vajracchedikā prajñā pāramitā sutra*) in its classic Chinese translation. "*A* is *A*. At the same time *A* is *non-A*: (Through these negations we can achieve a true knowledge, *that*) *This is called A*." One criticism of Zen Buddhism is that it is oriented primarily to examine one's own position, opinion and mind in *critical and self-critical* focus, and thus we must consider how far it is mixed up with a false position, with one's own subjectivism or egoism of any kind. The sharp negation of "*A* is *non-A*" goes on to clarify the following point: The first *A* in a tautology must be examined dialectically from various viewpoints in problematizing the issues of "Why can we name it *A*?", "What is *A* and what is *non-A*?" and also, "What is my self who decides this category *A* and another?" The self-critical questioning accompanies one's own life and enriches the field of experiences. Moreover, in the middle of an inter-action with another, the sharp logical examination of 即非 *soku-hi* / *non-soku* works as a sharp negation to the *soku*-optimism, and accompanies the whole development of one's own experience, thinking and communicating. It stimulates with a warning against optimism, syncretism and the lack of critical views. The core of the Huayan logic of "*A soku non-A*" and the cautiously critical and self-critical negation of the Zen Buddhist "*soku-hi*", [*A* is *A*] and [*A* is *non-A*], [*B* is *non-B*, *non-C* ...] etc."¹³ insists on the relationship of complementarity. Both logics are located in an open mind, in an open court for *real and intellectual inter-action*. Its principal orientation is the mind of transmission from one to another, a dynamic interaction and the mutual transmission of the self and that of other selves in the *Field of Between*. In this mind the thinking and acting system is highly useful for the contemporary world, in which everything runs only at the level of brief information with the only aim of getting more and more material profit for one's own ego, which is isolated from others.

What Results from the Combination of the Logic of *soku* and *Non-soku*?

The logic of *soku* 即 and *soku-hi* 即非 (*non-soku*), as a pair of logical principles, can open up a new area when applied to our thinking system in the contemporary world, for the following reasons.

12 即非の論理: Akizuki 1986, 22–25; Suzuki 1968, 380–3.

13 The dialectic construction of logic to grasp the problem of what is the [*A*] *per se* is similar to Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*, *Die Lehre vom Wesen*, the article of "Widerspruch" (Contradictory of *A* and *non-A*). See Hashi 2004 and Hashi 2002.

1. It construes a cooperative logic for an interdisciplinary community.
2. It has an ability to distinguish what can be a similarity and what should be more and more questioned and should be discussed in an *inter-activity*.
3. It has an ability to achieve integration to an advanced level. The latter is able *without* mixing with an easy average, *without* simple and false harmonizing, *without* a one-sided dogma, *without* an ignorance of other's entity.
4. It has the potential to achieve a *one-minded* group work for a community, and the Huayan logic of *soku* is the most effective approach to this issue.
5. It is able to reflect one's own thinking and acting in *human relations*, especially in the logic of Huayan.
6. The logic of *soku-hi/non-soku* in Zen has a direct contribution to getting and constructing a critical and self-critical mind.
7. It shows the *relevance of complementary* of [A and non-A]: The logic of [*soku*] and [*soku-hi /non-soku*] of Huayan and Zen Buddhist philosophy should be perceived as being in a complementary relationship.

Conclusion

In regard on the contemporary society in our globalized world, things and beings are often presented as collections of information that are constantly being added to. Self-identification and self-reference are always possible via the use of information technology, the media and social networks. Things are thus easy to “copy-paste-deliver” immediately, and thus send one's data to many others. On the surface everything is related in digital networks. In a cautious view of reflections—reality is running in the opposite direction. A lot of human beings as *different selves* are isolated from the environment, and often have relations that depend on their portable devices, such as smartphones. As human society is characterized by isolation and solitude, communication is lacking in many ways. The mind of a particular self falls into dependency on technology. The morality of a community cannot be construed in the ordinary way because every individual is mostly isolated from their own circumstance and environment. The most important lack is that of personal interaction, a “transmission” from one to another, and thus the mutual transmissions from one to another and *intra-relation* in meaningful communications are ignored.

Within this kind of destruction of humanity, one principle of Huayan Buddhist philosophy, namely *soku*, enables us to remember the significance of mutual transmission by members of human society, the relevance of a co-existential mindfulness. In the seven significant points outlined above it is evident that each has a

relation with another point, so that the logic of *soku* is able to construct a peaceful world and human community based on the principle of co-existence.

The Zen Buddhist logic of *soku-hi* 即非 (*non-soku*) accompanies our reflection with its sharp criticism to avoid easy optimism. We should thus combine the Huayan Buddhist way of "*soku*" with the Zen Buddhist way of sharp criticism, *soku-hi* (*non-soku*), keeping both positions in mind, the affirmation of the Huayan utopic ideal and its antithesis from Zen in the realist position. With regard to this dialectic harmony, Zen Buddhist philosophy tries to discover contradictions of every kind, to examine a discrepancy between the ideal and reality. Through this kind of sharp observation and dialectic thinking people can reconstruct their lives and world day by day. The execution of this ideal has a tight relation with reality, in which a thinking and acting human is present to manifest his own ethical ideals through his bodily existence and interactions with other people and beings in the environment.

In both principles of "*soku*" and *soku-hi* (*non-soku*) it is fundamental that each person is skilled in viewing the world and environment primarily not from an ego-centralized position, as the opposite approach is promoted in the Buddhist logic: this can be grasped as the "logic for co-existence", and is like the "Logic of the Field" by Nishida Kitarō¹⁴, the founder of the so-called Kyoto School. (Nishida 1965, 1966, 289) Humans, things and other beings in the environment should be focused on and grasped only from the wide enveloping view of the "Field of Co-Existence of the Whole World". The background of this logic is the "logic of the essential mind" (心の論理 *shin no ronri*). It envelops things and problems not only from a dualist position of criticism, but also from a place of "compassion" (Sans. *karuṇā*) to share the problem of suffering with another, and thus suffering people could overcome their problems by using co-existential logic.

The principles of *soku* and *soku-hi* (*non-soku*), are both useful in our time of global networks and communications, because the coupling of both dialectic positions stimulates us with reasonable questions as to how we can achieve meaningful communication in our daily lives.

References

- Akizuki, Ryōmin. 1978. *Akizuki, Ryōmin chosaku-shū* 秋月龍珉著作集, vol. 8. Tokyo: San'ishci shobō.
 —. 1980. *Kōan – jissenteiki zen nyūmon* 公案—実践の禅入門. Tokyo: Chimuma shobō.

14 西田幾多郎, 1870–1945, Kyoto School.

- . 1986. *Zen tetsugakutei shiron – anata wa doko ni ironoka?* “禅哲学的詩論—あなたはどこにいるのか?” In *Zen to gendai* 禅と現代, 22–25. Tokyo: Kawade shobō.
- Aristotle. 2000. *Metaphysik*, edited by F. Schwarz. Stuttgart: Reclam.
- Confucius. 1978. *Lun-yu* 論語. In *Kōshi, Mōshi* 孔子・孟子 (Confucius, Mencius), edited by Kaizuka. Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha.
- Fujita, Masakatsu. 2009. *Nippon ni okeru tetsugaku no juyō* 日本における「哲学」の受容. In *Iwanami kōza, tetsugaku* 岩波講座, vol. 14. Tokyo: Iwanami.
- Hashi, Hisaki. 2002. “Ninshiki to ronri 認識と論理.” *Oriental Studies* 東洋学研究 43: 45–62.
- . 2004. *Die Dynamik von Sein und Nichts*, IV. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
- . 2009. “Hikaku to iu hōhō 比較という方法.” *Iwanami kōza, tetsugaku* 岩波講座 哲学 14, *Tetsugakushi no tetsugaku* 哲学史の哲学. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
- . 2014a. *Philosophische Anthropologie zur globalen Welt*. Münster, Berlin, Zürich, London, Wien: LIT.
- . 2014b. “Cognition Embodied in Buddhist Philosophy.” *Philosophy Study* 2: 136–47.
- . 2015a. “Phenomenon of Life and Death by Dōgen and Heidegger—In View of “Embodied Cognition” in Buddhist Philosophy and Phenomenology.” *Asian Study* 2 (1): 105–28.
- . 2015b. “Phenomenology and Buddhist Philosophy.” *Dialogue and Universalism* 3: 179–97.
- . 2014/15. “Nakamura Hajime – Tōyōjin no shiyui hōhō” – Globaru gendai e no toikake 中村元『東洋人の思惟方法』—グローバル現代への問いかけ.” *Studies in Comparative Philosophy* 41: 98–105.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1975. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*. Stuttgart: Reclam.
- . 1986. *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- Klein, Hans-Dieter. 2002. “Der Begriff der Seele in Philosophie und Religion.” In *Der Begriff der Seele in der Religionswissenschaft*, edited by Johann Figl and Hans-Dieter Klein, 27–44. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Weber-Brosamer, Bernhard, and Dieter M. Back, eds. 2006. *Die Philosophie der Leere: Nagarjunas Mulamadhyamaka-arikas. Übersetzung des buddhistischen Basistextes mit kommentierenden Einführungen* (Beiträge zur Indologie). Berlin: Taschenbuch.
- Nakamura, Hajime, ed. 2004 (2003). “Hannya kyōten 般若經典.” In *Daijō butten* 大乘仏典, vol. 1. Tokyo: Iwanami.
- . 2005 (2003). “Avamatakyō, Lankavatarakyō 楞伽經・華嚴經.” In *Daijō butten* 大乘仏典, vol. 5. Tokyo: chūō-kōronsha.

- Nakamura, Hajime, and Kazuyoshi Kino, eds. 1990. *Hannya shingyō, kongō hannya-kyō* 般若心經・金剛般若經. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
- Nishida, Kitarō. 1965, 1966. *Complete Works*, vol. 11, 12, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
- Shiba, Haruhide. 2015. “Cognitive Science von Varela und psycho-physische Philosophie im Buddhismus. Zur Phänomenologie der Erfahrungen.” In *Denkdisziplinen. Interdisziplinäre Philosophie von Ost und West*, edited by Hisaki Hashi, 246–83. Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz Verlag.
- Sueki, Takehiro. 1980. *Tōyō no gōri shisō* 東洋の合理思想. Tokyo: Kōdansha.
- Suzuki, Daisetz. 1968. *Complete Works* vol. 5. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
- Takakusu, Junjirō, and Kaogyoku Watanabe, eds. 1990. *Taishō Tripitaka* (大正新修大藏經), vol. 45, Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai.
- Takasaki, Jikidō, and Kyōshō Hayashima, eds. 1993. *Bukkyō- indo shisō jiten* 仏教・インド思想辞典. Tokyo: Shunjūsha.
- Tsujimura, Kōichi. 1985. “Zur Differenz der All-Einheit im Westen und Osten.” In *All-Einheit*, edited by Dieter Henrich, 23. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.